Electromagnetic pulse and its threat to data centers

Overview

This document is Uptime Institute Intelligence's UII Briefing Report 76, dated August 2022 and written by J. Davis. The report summarises natural and artificial electromagnetic pulse (EMP) types, their effects on electronic equipment and the electricity grid, and offers recommendations for EMP risk assessment. The full text sits behind a registration form or an Uptime Intelligence subscription, so this page rests only on the public landing page.

The first point the landing page stresses is that most data centre operators do not include EMP in their risk assessments or protection. This shows a low-probability, high-impact threat being systematically overlooked across the industry.

The second point is that some EMP forms act most strongly on the power grid, with only secondary effects on data centres. A facility may therefore be exposed less through a direct pulse than through grid outage and prolonged loss of external power. This view also bears on fuel, generator and on-site endurance planning.

Third, government and military infrastructure use EMP protective measures, and some of them may be useful to non-government data centres. The report also recommends repeating risk assessments that include EMP periodically as risk profiles change. As a limitation, detailed technical methods and quantitative data are in the member report and are not reproduced here. Copyright belongs to Uptime Institute.

Key points

1. The report is UII Briefing Report 76, published in August 2022.
2. Most data centre operators do not include EMP in risk assessment or protection.
3. Some EMP forms act most strongly on the power grid, with secondary effects on data centres.
4. Government and military infrastructure use EMP protective measures.
5. Some of those measures can be useful for non-government data centres.
6. Risk assessments including EMP are best repeated periodically as risk profiles change.
7. Access to the full report requires registration or a subscription.

Using it in design

• Add EMP and geomagnetic disturbance (GMD) to the risk register as an optional site hazard.
• When assessing grid-borne effects, link the prolonged external power loss scenario to fuel and generator planning.
• Fold EMP assessment into periodic risk reviews instead of treating it as a one-off exercise.

Who should read it

Data centre risk managers, site-selection planners and engineers responsible for critical infrastructure resilience.

Publication details

Authors

J. Davis

Publisher

Uptime Institute Intelligence

Year

2022

Document number

UII Briefing Report 76

Document language

English

Source type

Industry body

Access

Citation only

Licence

Copyright retained; citation only — the publisher’s terms apply to the original document

Citation